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privileged character. The question, then, upon final analysis
is as to how far the illegally gained information must enter
into the statement in order to make it unsusceptible of publication. This is a matter of social engineering. The court again
must weigh the defendant's claim to make a free disclosure of
the truth, against the law's interest in preserving ethical conduct. The conflicting interests involved are the same as those
already considered. This time, however, they are weighed in
the light of the particular facts before the court, and the balance
is made upon a keener edge, namely, the edge of quantity.
There obviously can be no pat solution to this last problem
suggested. All that legal -theory can do is to afford a means
of posing the problem and to offer a comfortable medium for
expressing whatever conclusion the court may reach in a given
controversy. To this end, nothing can be found more adaptable
than the "substantial factor" formula: Was the employment of
the illegally established stations a substantial factor in enabling
the defendant to arrive at the conclusion which he made public?
The "substantial factor" test may likely be used twice in the
same controversy, for it may be necessary to inquire whether or
not the defendant's statement was a substantial factor in producing the decline in market value of which the plaintiff complains. In the latter, instance there is a genuine problem of
causal sequence.2
WEX S. MALONE*

THE RESURRECTION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
LIBERAL CRIMINAL VENUE PROVISION
Under the Louisiana constitution, the trial for a crime must
take place in the parish where the offense was committed.1 This
provision presents no difficulty when an offense is completed
within a single parish. However, modern crime has little or no
respect for parish lines. An offense may be begun in one parish,
partly executed in another, and completed in a third. In what
one parish was the crime committed? In attempting to solve such
legal riddles, the courts are often forced .to rely on fiction and
29. Recovery was denied on this ground in Thomas v. Texas Co., 12 S.
W. (2d) 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).

* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9.
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artificial reasoning. A few cases will serve to illustrate the confusion.

In State v. Hart2 defendant was indicted in Lincoln Parish
for obtaining money from Louisiana Polytechnic Institute by
falsifying a building contract. Some of the payments on the contract were made to Hart in Lincoln Parish by checks which were
drawn on local banks but were cashed elsewhere. The remainder
of the contract price was paid by checks drawn on a Lincoln
Parish Bank, but delivered outside that parish, and deposited in
still another parish. In holding that the venue was proper, the
court asserted that the crime was not complete until the checks
were paid by the drawee bank. However, in a prior case' the
court had stated unequivocally that the parish of the drawee
bank was not the proper place of venue for the crime of obtaining
money under false pretenses.
In State v. Smith4 defendant was prosecuted in Orleans Parish for embezzlement. Smith drew a check on Louigiana State
University's account in a Baton Rouge bank and delivered it to
Hart in Baton Rouge. Hart cashed the check in New Orleans and
divided the proceeds with Smith and his fellow conspirators. The
court concluded that the trial must be held in East Baton Rouge
Parish because it was there that defendant first had possession
with the intent to convert to his own use. The court also stated
that East Baton Rouge was the proper place for trial because the
offense was not completed until payment by the drawee bank.
Eight attempts5 were made during the 1939-1940 term of the

supreme court to pass the case from parish to parish under similar complex factual situations. In four instances the efforts were
successful. From this it can be readily appreciated that extreme
difficulty is encountered by the court in seeking to put its finger
on the one parish where the crime was committed. The administration of criminal law would be greatly facilitated by a statute
authorizing trial in the parish where any element of an offense
was committed, although the crime may have been continued or
completed elsewhere. The object of such a statute is to relieve the
state, in the prosecution of criminal actions, of much embarrassment and difficulty.
2. 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940).
3. State v. Roy, 155 La. 238, 99 So. 205 (1924).
4. 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940).
5. State v. Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940); State v. Terzia, 194
La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940); State v. Todd, 194 La. 595, 194 So. 31 (1940); State
v. Coenen, 194 La. 753, 194 So. 771 (1940); State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So.
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The right to a trial by a jury of the parish in which the crime
was committed is generally considered as a substantial legal
right. This right was originally predicated upon the idea that the
accused should be tried by his immediate neighbors who probably were personally acquainted with him and who would better
understand the facts of the case. The difficulty of transporting
witnesses was another practical consideration. Not only are these
considerations considered unimportant today, but the nature of
criminal offenses has changed. Originally crimes were nearly
always local in nature. In modern times, however, different considerations come into play where an offense may be partly committed in several parishes under such circumstances that it cannot be definitely located in any one particular place. In such
instances there is no substantial reason why the person accused
of such crime should be tried in one parish rather than another.
A strict venue rule, requiring the district attorney to choose the
proper parish at his peril, serves only to provide an instrument
whereby adroit defense lawyers further delay the already slow
processes of the criminal trial.
Louisiana procedural statutes do include a liberal venue
rule.6 It was first enacted as Act 121 of 1855 providing
"Where any crime or misdemeanor ... shall be begun in
one parish and completed in another, it may be dealt with,
inquired of, tried, determined and punished in either of the
parishes in the same manner as if it had been actually and
wholly committed therein ......
This statute was subsequently reenacted as Section 988 of the
Revised Statutes of 1870.
The act further provided that where a crime was committed
within one hundred yards of the boundary separating two parishes, it was triable in either. In 1905, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in State v. Montgomery' held this latter portion of the act
unconstitutional. In 1921, this constitutional objection was removed."
Later, in State v. Moore,' a libel case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held Section 988 unconstitutional in its entirety. Justice
523 (1940); State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940); State v. Weiss, 195
La. 206, 196 So. 69 (1940); State v. Leon C. Weiss, 195 La. 208, 196 So. 70 (1940).
6. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 988.
7. 115 La. 155, 38 So. 949 (1905).
8. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, §9.
9. 140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916).
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O'Niell declared that it contravened the requirement that all
criminal trials must take place in the parish where the offense
was committed. 10 In State v. Smith" the unconstitutionality of
the act was re-asserted. However, shortly after the Smith case,
the supreme court, after having been harassed by a member of
complex venue problems, made the following statement by way
of dictum:
"It is possible that the court might hold,-if it were
necessary to decide the question,-that this prosecution might
have been brought in Vermilion parish under the provision in
Section 988 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 .... That statute,
which was enacted originally as Section 12 of Act No. 121 of
1855, was declared unconstitutional, in the case of State v.
Montgomery, 115 La. 155, 38 So. 949, but only in so far as
the statute undertook to allow a prosecution to be had in a
parish other than that in which the crime was committed, provided it was committed within 100 yards from the boundary
line of the parish in which the prosecution is had. That constitutional objection has been removed by a provision in Section 9 of Article 1 of the Constitution of 1921, allowing a prosecution to be had in either parish where the crime was committed within 100 yards from a boundary between the two
parishes. But we are not aware of any constitutional objection to the provision in Section 988 of the Revised Statutes
with reference to a crime that was begun in one parish and
''12
completed in another.
It is believed that this dictum indicates a more liberal attitude on
the part of the court toward the section in question and toward
other liberal venue provisions.
The courts of several other jurisdictions have upheld statutes
similar to Section 988. In Indiana, 3 statutes have been sustained
which allow a prosecution in either county, where the death blow
10. The Constitution of 1864, for the first time, contained a requirement
that "all criminal trials shall take place in the parish in which the crime
shall have been committed." La. Const. (1864) Art. CV. This provision has
been carried forward into every constitution since that time.
11. 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940).
12. State v. Hart, 195 La. 184, 204-205, 196 So. 62, 69 (1940).
In State v. Cason, 5 So. (2d) 121, 125 (Nov. 3, 1941), the court impliedly
recognized the validity of La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 988: "The statute is
without application to the crime charged against the relators. . . . On the
contrary, the embezzlement was committed, if at all, by Cason wholly within
the Parish of East Baton Rouge ......
13. Ind. Const., Art. 2, § 13.

1942]

COMMENTS

was struck in one county and death occurred in another; 4 and
where several elements constituting the offense were committed
in different counties."5 The Indiana Supreme Court reasoned,
"Since the thing that constituted the crime denounced was accomplished partly in each of the counties, the legislative enactment fixing the jurisdiction in either county does not offend
against the constitutional provision."''
The State of Washington has a statute almost identical with
Section 988.17 In upholding its constitutionality, the supreme
court asserted,
"However, while there could be no crime of obtaining property by false pretenses in either element-a false representation, or the delivery of the property- was absent, the constitutional guaranty of a trial of the defendant in the.county
in which the crime is alleged to have been committed is satisfied when part of the acts constituting the crime are performed in the county in which the information is brought
against the defendant."' 8
Florida upheld a like enactment under similar circumstances. 9
In West Virginia, a prisoner escaped from a road gang in
County A, and prosecution was brought in County B where the
state penitentiary was located, upon the theory that he was constructively present at that place. In discussing the meaning of
the West Virginia constitutional provision that all criminal trials
must take place in the county in which the crime was committed.2 0 the court declared,
"The crime itself or some act or element entering into it must
actually have taken place in the county where the venue is
laid -and the trial had. It is true that certain crimes may take
14. Peats v. State, 213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E. (2d) 270 (1938). Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §9-211. Kentucky has also upheld the jurisdiction in either
county where the wound was inflicted in one county and death ensued in
another although the constitutionality of the statute permitting the action
was not directly raised. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 688, 108 S.W.
(2d) 655 (1937); Arnett v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 335, 109 S.W. (2d) 795
(1937). Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1936) § 1147.
15. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §9-207.
16. Peats v. State, 213 Ind. 560, 565, 12 N.E. (2d) 270, 273 (1938).
17. Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §2013.
18. State v. Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 689, 66 P.(2d) 836, 840 (1937). See also
State v. Knutson, 168 Wash. 633, 12 P.(2d) 923 (1932); State v. Dillon, 188
Wash. 265, 62 P. (2d) 38 (1936).
19. See Smith v. State, 42 Fla. 605, 28 So. 758 (1900), arising under Fla.
Const., Art. I, § 11.
20. W. Va. Const., Art. III, § 14.
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place and can be committed in more than one locality, in
which case venue may be laid in all or any of such places." 1
Wisconsin, with a constitutional provision similar to our
own, 2 allowed the prosecution of a state bank commissioner in
County A for failure to close a bank in County B.2 3 The court
reasoned that while it was his duty to proceed to B County and
close the bank, the evil intent was initiated in County A. Such
statutes, asserted the court, must be construed in so far as possible harmoniously with their policy and the common law. It will
be noted that the constitutionality of the proceedings was not directly raised.
Oklahoma, also with a like constitutional provision, 24 has a
very flexible venue law;2 5 where "the acts or effects thereof, constituting or requisite to the offense, occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county." In upholding this
statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court asserted, "'Consequently,
as at least some of the fraudulent acts and pretenses were made
and performed in that county, it is clear that the offense was
partly committed there, and the court had jurisdiction.' "2,;
The South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the constitutional provision of that state providing that the defendants
in criminal trials must be charged in the "county where the
offense was committed, 2 7 as meaning that the offender must be
tried in that county where the offense was deemed committed
under the law as it existed at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, and it upheld a prior act 2 8 which had
stipulated that where a death blow was struck in one county and
the victim died in another defendant could be prosecuted in
21. State v. Dignan, 114 W. Va. 275, 278, 171 S.E. 527, 528 (1933). But,
where a statute authorized the trial of an accessary after the fact in the
county where the principal crime was committed, the West Virginia court
held it unconstitutional, saying such an offense could not be said "to have
occurred at the time and place of, the principal crime." State v. Overholt,
111 W. Va. 417, 162 S.E. 317 (1932). See State v. Ellison, 49 W. Va. 70, 38
S.E. 574 (1901); Weill v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S.E. 666 (1915). But see an
analogous statute punishing the receiver of stolen goods where the larceny
was committed. Texas Code of Crim. Proc. (1925) Art. 200. See Mathis v.
State, 133 Tex. Cr. 367, 111 S.W. (2d) 252 (1937); Giles v. State, 133 Tex. Cr.
454, 112 S.W. (2d) 473 (1938).
22. Wis. Const., Art. 1, § 7.
23. State ex rel. Schwenker v. District Court of Wilwaukee County, 206
Wis. 600, 240 N.W. 406 (1932), followed in 206 Wis. 609, 240 N.W. 410 (1932).
24. Okla. Const., Art. II, § 20.
25. Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936), tit. 22, § 124.
26. Troup v. State, 51 Okla. Cr. 438, 446, 2 P.(2d) 591, 594 (1931).
27. S.C. Const. of 1895, Art. VI, § 2.
28. S.C. Code (1932) § 1020.
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either.29 It will be noted that this approach might with equal ease
be taken toward our Revised Statutes, Section 988, which antedates the constitutional provision in question.80
The Ohio court upheld a statute"' providing that certain nuisances could be tried in any county whose inhabitants were
aggrieved thereby, although the act comprising the nuisance took
place elsewhere.8 2 This act, said the court, does not offend the
constitutional guaranty that all criminal trials must be held in
the county where the offense was committed. 33 The Minnesota
Supreme Court stated by way of dictum that prosecution under
a statute forbidding price discrimination by purchasers of milk
could be brought in either county in cases where the several
34
sales in question took place in different counties.
A Missouri statute was concerned with offenses committed
on board of trains and vessels. It authorized a prosecution "in
any county through which or part of which such vessel or railroad car shall be navigated or run in the course of the same
voyage or trip, or in the county where such voyage or trip shall
terminate."3 5 The supreme court of the state held this act invalid.
In the decision, however, it was manifest that no offense, or part
of any offense actually occurred in the county where the indict86
ment was brought.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a
statute similar to-the Louisiana sections in question,87 despite the
specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution that the trial shall be held "in the state and
district wherein the crime was committed." Defendant was
charged in the Idaho district with having conspired in Butte,
Montana, to unlawfully sell narcotics in both Montana and
29. State v. McCoomer, 79 S.C. 63, 60 S.E. 237 (1908).
30. Section 988 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 was first passed as Act
121 of 1855. The Constitution of 1864, Art. 105, for the first time contained the
requirement that "all criminal trials shall take place in the parish where the
crime was committed."
31. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 12659.
32. American Strawboard Co. v. State, 70 Ohio St. 140, 71 N.E. 284 (1904).
33. Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10.
34. State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 202 N.W. 714, 42 A.L.R.
548 (1925), arising under Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 3507.
35. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1899) § 2413. Mo. Const., Art. II, § 22.
36. State v. Meyers, 191 Mo. 149, 90 S.W. 100 (1905).
37. 36 Stat. 1100 (1911) 28 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1927). It should be noted that
the Sixth Amendment has no application to state action. Eilenbacker v.
District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 10 S.Ct. 424, 33 L.Ed. 801
(1890).
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Idaho. He objected to the jurisdiction of the Idaho court. The
federal court stated that "it is thoroughly settled as the law of
conspiracy, that a conspirator may be prosecuted either at the
place where the conspiracy is formed or where an overt act pursuant thereto is committed." 8 Application for a writ of certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court.3 9 The circuit court applied
Section 731 of the United States Revised Statutes, providing that
when an offense against the United States is begun in one judicial
district and completed in another, it may be tried and punished
in either district "in the same manner as if it had been actually
and wholly committed therein.

' 40

Cases from other jurisdictions upholding statutes similar to
Section 988 of the Revised Statutes have been set out in considerable detail. They point unmistakably to the conclusion that the
dictum statement of Chief Justice O'Niell in State v. Hart41 represents a usual and logical interpretation of the constitutional
requirement that "all trials shall take place in the parish in
which the offense was committed, unless the venue be changed."
Any attempt to provide that a criminal trial may be held in a
parish which is wholly unconnected with the commission of the
offense is clearly unconstitutional. This does not mean, however,
that it is impossible to permit a prosecution in any of several
parishes, all of which have a substantial connection with the
offense or an element thereof. Such liberalized venue procedure
will prevent astute defense attorneys from "passing the buck"
from parish to parish, while state's evidence gets cold and key
witnesses forget. The answer to the problem in Louisiana is the
retention and utilization of Revised Statutes, Section 988. In view
of its importance, it is recommended that the substance of this
provision be re-enacted as an amendment to Article 13 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. 42 A proper application of such a statute
will do much to minimize the venue nightmare, which has
plagued Louisiana district attorneys and courts.
GILBERT DUPRE LITTON
38. Grigg v. Bolton, 53 F.(2d) 158 (1931).
39. 52 S. Ct. 311, 285 U.S. 538, 76 L.Ed. 931 (1932).
40. 36 Stat. 1100 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1927).
41. 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940).
42. All trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense shall
have been committed unless the venue be changed; provided that where
the several acts constituting a crime are committed in more than one parish,
it may be tried in any parish where a substantial element of the crime was
committed.

